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NOT YET FORGIVEN FOR BEING BLACK:
HAITI’S TPS, LDF, AND THE PROTEAN
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE
Raymond Audain*
In November 2017, the Trump administration announced its
intention to terminate Temporary Protected Status for Haitians in the
United States. This Article considers the termination and the lawsuits
it prompted, which are helping to define the state of the plenary power
doctrine, the breadth of the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection
guarantee, and the purchase of the communitarian ideal. This Article
also focuses on the lawsuit that the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) filed. Although this may appear to be
a new operational context for the organization, the author describes
LDF’s strong interest in ensuring that the federal government respects
fundamental equal protection principles in its policies related to
immigrants.

* Senior Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. This Article is based
on a panel presentation I gave at Immigration Politics: Shifting Norms, Policies and Practices,
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, March 2018. I wish to thank Professor Kathleen C. Kim for
inviting me to participate. I also wish to thank Samuel Spital, Ellie Happel, Ummi Ansari, Ajmel
Quereshi, and the excellent staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their insightful
comments and editorial suggestions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In January 2010, Haiti was struck by one of the deadliest
earthquakes in modern history.1 It killed thousands of Haitians, left
more than a million people homeless, and nearly destroyed Port-auPrince.2 Haiti’s recovery efforts have been hobbled by two additional
catastrophes. First, in October 2010, there was a large-scale outbreak
of cholera.3 Then, in October 2016, Hurricane Matthew ravaged parts
of the country and killed more than 500 people.4 These extraordinary
circumstances compelled the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) to designate Haiti for Temporary Protected Status (TPS)5 in
2010, to re-designate Haiti in 2011,6 and to repeatedly extend that
designation over the next six years.7 But the Trump administration
took a different view of Haiti’s TPS designation, one in keeping with
its outspoken antagonism towards immigrants of color. Soon after
1. LAURENT DUBOIS, HAITI: THE AFTERSHOCKS OF HISTORY 3 (2012).
2. Id.; see Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 75 Fed. Reg. 3,476, 3,477
(Jan. 21, 2010); Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 76 Fed. Reg.
29,000, 29,001 (May 19, 2011) (noting the government of Haiti estimated that 230,000 people died
and more than one million Haitians were left homeless); Extension of the Designation of Haiti for
Temporary Protected Status, 77 Fed. Reg. 59,943, 59,943 (Oct. 1 2012) (“Haitian government
estimates of the death toll caused by the earthquake have ranged from 230,000 to over 300,000
people.”); Haiti: One Year Later, OCHA (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.unocha.org/story/haiti-oneyear-later (earthquake caused over 222,000 deaths and over 300,000 injuries, left over 1.5 million
people homeless, and caused “[w]idespread destruction in Port-au-Prince”).
3. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., TPS CONSIDERATIONS: HAITI (DECEMBER
2016) 3 (Dec. 2016), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Haiti_TPS_StateDeptDec2016-HaitiMemo.pdf.
4. See Rapidly Assessing the Impact of Hurricane Matthew in Haiti, THE WORLD BANK
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.worldbank.org/en/results/2017/10/20/rapidly-assessing-the-impactof-hurricane-matthew-in-haiti; see also Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary
Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg. 23,830, 23,832 (May 24, 2017) (noting that the Haitian government
confirmed 546 fatalities from the storm).
5. The Immigration Act of 1990 created the TPS program. Miscellaneous and Technical
Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–232, 105 Stat. 1733 (1991).
TPS enables immigrants to live and work in the United States while their country of origin recovers
from civil unrest, violence, or natural disasters. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a,
the Attorney General was authorized to administer the TPS program. The authority to designate
countries and administer the TPS program was transferred from the Attorney General to the
Secretary of Homeland Security in 2003, with the formation of the Department of Homeland
Security. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). The
Secretary of Homeland Security has discretion to issue TPS for periods of six to eighteen months.
8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)–(2). Thereafter, the Secretary must review the conditions in the foreign
state and determine whether the reasons for the designation persist. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3).
6. Extension and Redesignation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 76 Fed. Reg. 29,000
(May 19, 2011).
7. Extension of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 82 Fed. Reg.
23,830, 23,831 (May 24, 2017).
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taking office, the administration warned beneficiaries to prepare for
their return to Haiti.8 Then, in November 2017, DHS announced that
it would terminate the program in January 2018, with a delayed
effective date of July 2019.9 As the Haitian government has
explained,10 Haiti cannot safely repatriate the approximately 58,000
Haitians in the United States who have TPS.11 The U.S. Embassy in
Haiti agreed,12 and no objective review of country conditions could
militate otherwise. But the administration’s decision to end TPS for
Haiti does not reflect an objective review of country conditions.
Instead, it reflects racial animus against Haitian TPS recipients.
As such, in January 2018, the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) filed a lawsuit that challenged the
rescission decision on equal protection grounds.13 For almost eighty
years, LDF has focused on vindicating the rights of Black Americans
across the United States.14 Filing suit on behalf of Haitian immigrants
may appear to be a new operational context for LDF. However, the
racial justice implications of the rescission are profound. First, many
of the racial disparities that bedevil our domestic public institutions
also bedevil the immigration system.15 And, as LDF’s DirectorCounsel explained, it would be unacceptable for LDF to afford the
government any leeway to make a decision based on racial

8. Id. at 23,830.
9. Termination of the Designation of Haiti for Temporary Protected Status, 83 Fed. Reg.
2,648 (Jan. 18, 2018).
10. See Letter from Paul G. Altidor, Ambassador, Republic of Haiti, to Elaine C. Duke, Sec’y,
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.miamiherald.com/latestnews/article178072401.ece/binary/Lettertothe%20HonorableElaineC.Duke.pdf.
11. Ellie Happel, Ending TPS for Haitians Was Unlawful—and Racist, Too, MIAMI HERALD
(Aug. 22, 2018, 6:49 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article217167695.html.
12. See Saget v. Trump, 375 F. Supp. 3d 280, 317 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
13. Complaint, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., 364 F. Supp. 3d 568 (D. Md. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-00239-MJG), 2018 WL 550254.
14. History, LDF, https://www.naacpldf.org/about-us/history/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
15. See, e.g., JULIANA MORGAN-TROSTLE & KEXIN ZHENG, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW
IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS
CLINIC,
THE
STATE
OF
BLACK
IMMIGRANTS,
http://www.stateofblackimmigrants.com/assets/sobi-fullreport-jan22.pdf; see also Teresa Wiltz,
For Some Black Immigrants, Life in Limbo, PEW: STATELINE (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/09/27/for-some-blackimmigrants-life-in-limbo (“Immigration experts say that black immigrants face more
discrimination and scrutiny than other migrant groups. Many of the challenges they face intersect
with the challenges of native-born African-Americans, from housing discrimination to
disproportionate representation in the criminal justice system.”).
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discrimination in any context.16 LDF took the same position in similar
circumstances more than thirty years ago when it warned that the
federal government cannot be left to discriminate with impunity
against thousands of Haitian asylees, in part because that would
reinforce racist attitudes and undermine the national goal of
eliminating racial and ethnic discrimination.17
LDF’s commitment to the elimination of racial discrimination
found its greatest expression in Brown v. Board of Education,18 the
decision that overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson.19 Brown has been described as the most important Supreme
Court decision of the twentieth century;20 it is the wellspring of
modern equal protection jurisprudence.21 In the immigration context,
however, Brown’s impact22 has been blunted by the so-called plenary
power doctrine, which, some believe, gives Congress and the
President almost total latitude to discriminate against excludable
immigrants, even on the basis of race.23 The doctrine is rooted in the
16. Don’t Tell Your Story Too Soon, CROOKED: POD SAVE THE PEOPLE (Feb. 27, 2018),
https://crooked.com/podcast/dont-tell-your-story-too-soon/.
17. See Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. In Support
of Petitioners, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (No. 84-5240), 1985 WL 670075, at *4.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). A largely Haitian American organization in New Orleans, the Comité
des Citoyens, was responsible for bringing Plessy, and the litigant, Homer Plessy, was HaitianAmerican. See ROGER DANIELS, GUARDING THE GOLDEN DOOR: AMERICAN IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND IMMIGRANTS SINCE 1882 212 (2004).
20. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 344 (2004); Derrick A. Bell,
Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and The Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518,
518 (1980).
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 696 (5th Ed.
2015).
22. Professor Hiroshi Motomura has explained that “[t]he historical path from Brown in 1954
to the important amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 is a very direct one.”
Hiroshi Motomura, Brown v. Board of Education, Immigrants, and the Meaning of Equality, 49
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2005). The 1965 amendments ended the national origins
system that dated back to the 1920s and codified the federal government’s preference for northern
and western European immigrants. Id. “It’s no coincidence that in the same year as the 1965
immigration amendments ended that very blatant form of white privilege in the immigration
system, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 also became law.” Id.
23. See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3
(1984) (“The currents that have transfigured constitutional jurisprudence, administrative law, civil
rights, and judicial ideology since the New Deal and especially since the 1960s, have largely passed
immigration law by . . . .”); see also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
547 (1990) (“The plenary power doctrine’s contours have changed over the years, but in general
the doctrine declares that Congress and the executive branch have broad and often exclusive
authority over immigration decisions.”); Catherine Y. Kim, Plenary Power in the Modern
Administrative State, 96 N.C. L. REV. 77, 79 (2017) (Pursuant to “plenary power” doctrine, “courts
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notorious Chinese Exclusion Case of 1889,24 which reflects the same
bigotry as Plessy.25 Louis Henkin famously described the doctrine as
a “constitutional fossil, a remnant of a prerights jurisprudence that we
have proudly rejected in other respects.”26 Indeed, although some
courts continue to abide by the plenary power doctrine despite its
dreadful origins, its sway has been steadily diminishing.27 The
administration’s unapologetically racialized approach to immigration
is forcing courts to consider anew the extent to which the federal

allowed the government to exclude noncitizens on the basis of race” and “categorically denied
review over government decisions that would plainly violate constitutional rights outside of the
immigration context.”).
24. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“If . . . the government of the
United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different
race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their
exclusion is not to be stayed . . . . [Such a] determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.”); see
also Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (defining the contours of “the province of the
judiciary”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (same); Hiroshi Motomura,
Haitian Asylum Seekers: Interdiction and Immigrants’ Rights, 26 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 695, 696
(1993) (“[Chae Chan Ping] marks the beginning of the plenary power doctrine, which in its purest
form severely limits (and often completely forecloses) judicial consideration of constitutional
challenges to immigration decisions by the political branches.”).
25. See Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (1998) (“The legislative history of the
statutes approved by the Court in the plenary power cases indicates that they were not primarily
motivated by a desire to influence foreign policy or international affairs, or even to protect
American labor, but instead to foster white supremacy by defending white civilization against an
undesirable race.”); see also Schuck, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that classical immigration law
reflects exclusionary impulses, “celebrated norms and countenanced practices that were decidedly,
sometimes grotesquely, illiberal”).
26. Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 862 (1987).
27. See Kim, supra note 23, at 79 (noting that courts have “largely retreated from plenary
power principles” and “commentators have been discussing the ‘demise’ of plenary power for
decades”); see also Motomura, supra note 23, at 547 (By 1954, “the doctrine had long been under
heavy fire from many quarters. Critics expressed deep concern over the continuing isolation of an
entire body of law from the mainstream of American public law—isolation not only from the
process of constitutional judicial review, but also from the constitutional norms and principles
developed through that process over the years. Even though the Court had endorsed some version
of the plenary power doctrine in cases decided in the 1970’s, a number of observers had predicted
the gradual demise of the doctrine and a corresponding reintegration of our usual expectations
regarding judicial review into immigration law.”) (footnotes omitted). One school argues that the
erosion of plenary power reflects “a larger administrative law project to constrain the” delegation
of discretion “to unelected agency officials.” See Kim, supra note 23, at 113. The “delegation
concerns” argument suggests that courts have not repudiated the plenary power doctrine but have
instead reserved it for Congress and the President, who are not at liberty to delegate it to unelected
agency officials. Id. at 115. Another school argues that courts’ decreased commitment to plenary
power reflects the incremental integration of modern equal protection principles into the
immigration context, a traditional area of judicial restraint. See Motomura, supra note 23, at 566–
67.
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government is unconstrained to discriminate against immigrants of
color.
II. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND HAITI’S TPS
President Trump has long made clear his hostility towards
immigrants of color and his preference for white immigrants. In
June 2017, the President articulated his antipathy towards Black
immigrants specifically when he reportedly reacted to a document
listing the number of immigrants who had received visas in 2017.28
Upon learning that 15,000 Haitians were allowed to enter the United
States, President Trump is reported to have said, they “all have
AIDS.”29 During that June 2017 meeting, President Trump also
learned that 40,000 immigrants from Nigeria had received visas to
enter the United States in 2017.30 According to news reports, he
reacted by stating that, once they had seen the United States, these
Nigerian immigrants would never go back to their “huts” in Africa.31
The President upbraided his senior advisers for the perceived influx of
immigrants of color.32
During a subsequent White House meeting with several U.S.
Senators, the President is alleged to have disparaged a draft
immigration plan that included people from Haiti, El Salvador, and
some African countries, asking, “Why are we having all these people
from shithole countries come here?”33 President Trump is alleged to
have further disparaged Haitians in particular, asking, “Why do we
need more Haitians?”—and ordered the bill’s drafters to “[t]ake them
out.”34 The President allegedly expressed his preference for more
28. Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Stoking Fears, Trump Defied Bureaucracy
to Advance Immigration Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/23/us/politics/trump-immigration.html.
29. Id. This article states that other officials insist that President Trump never used the words
“AIDS” or “huts.” Id. Several participants in the meeting said that they did not recall President
Trump using those words. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from ‘Shithole’ Countries,
WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacks-protectionsfor-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/2018/01/11/bfc0725c-f711-11e791af-31ac729add94_story.html?utm_term=.b56f11cc896f. Other senators have suggested the word
used might have been “shithouse.” Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump’s Harsh Words, Not His Plan for
Wall,
Dominate
Hearing,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/us/politics/trump-shithole-shithouse-immigration.html.
34. Dawsey, supra note 33.
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immigrants from places like Norway,35 where the population is over
90 percent white.36 Haiti’s population, by contrast, is over 95 percent
Black.37 As Senator Richard Durbin pointed out, President Trump’s
singling out of Haitians for exclusion was “an obvious racial
decision.”38
The administration gamed the TPS review process to paper over
this obvious racial decision. First, as the district court decision in Saget
v. Trump39 details, White House officials pressured DHS to terminate
the program, warning Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Elaine
C. Duke that they would be “extremely disappointed” if she delayed
the decision.40 Similarly, Attorney General Jeff Sessions pushed
Secretary Duke to “ha[ve] the guts to pull the trigger.”41 And,
according to Saget, Secretary Duke “was well aware the White House
wanted to terminate TPS for Haiti and other predominantly non-white
foreign nations.”42 Secretary Duke’s own handwritten notes indicate
that she understood what was happening.43 “This conclusion,” she
wrote, “is the result of an America first view of the TPS decision.”44
The administration also tried to sabotage Haiti’s TPS by
attempting to create a public narrative that traded on some of the most
insidious anti-Black stereotypes. In early 2017, DHS and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) appointees sought
crime and public assistance data on Haitians with TPS.45 In an
35. Id.
36. See Jennifer Bendery, Trump’s Homeland Security Chief Not Sure if Norway Is Mostly
White,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan. 16, 2018,
1:38
PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kirstjen-neilsen-norway-whitetrump_us_5a5e2a44e4b0fcbc3a13dbb4;
The
World Factbook:
Norway, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/no.html (last updated Feb. 18, 2019).
37. The
World
Factbook:
Haiti,
CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ha.html
(last
updated
Feb. 24, 2019).
38. Carl Hulse, Inside the Oval Office Immigration Meeting that Left a Senator Stunned, N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/us/politics/trump-durbinimmigration-daca.html.
39. 375 F. Supp. 3d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
40. Id. at 348.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 370.
43. Id. at 347–48.
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 307; see also Alicia A. Caldwell, AP Exclusive: US Digs for Evidence of Haiti
Immigrant Crimes, AP NEWS (May 9, 2017), https://apnews.com/740ed5b40ce84bb398c82c4888
4be616 (“Internal emails . . . show a top immigration official wanted not only crime data on Haitians
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April 2017 email, USCIS’s Office of Policy and Strategy Chief
directed her staff to compile “details on how many [Haitian] TPS
holders are on public and private relief” and “how many have been
convicted of crimes of any kind (any criminal/detainer stats you can
find).”46 She also sought information on how many were “out of
work,” and the number of current Haitian TPS recipients who were
“illegal pre-TPS designation.”47 After staff said they could not gather
the information, she pressed them to search further. “I know some of
it is not captured,” she said, “but we’ll have to figure out a way to
squeeze more data out of our system.”48 Likewise, in an April 2017
email, Secretary of Homeland Security John F. Kelly directed staff to
collect, “[s]pecific to Haiti, details on how many are on public and
private relief, how many school aged kids [are] in school, how many
[are] convicted of crimes of any kind.”49 “According to internal DHS
communications,” Saget explains, “officials sought this data to bolster
the decision to terminate TPS for Haiti.”50
Of course, these data are irrelevant to any assessment of country
conditions,51 and DHS’s relentless efforts to manufacture prejudicial
evidence about Haitian TPS recipients drew the attention of
lawmakers. Senator Bill Nelson wrote to Secretary Kelly to express
his concern about the reports.52 So did Senators Robert Menendez,
Ron Wyden, Edward Markey, Kirsten Gillibrand, and Sherrod Brown,
who expressed their alarm about “the troubling news that your
department has asked for information on the criminal history and
who are protected from deportation under the [TPS] program, but also how many were receiving
public benefits.”).
46. Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(B)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6), or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56, Exhibit 20 at 1, Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv01599-WFK-ST).
47. Id. at 49.
48. Caldwell, supra note 45; see also Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 309 (quoting April 27, 2017,
email to USCIS staffers).
49. Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 307–08 (alteration in original).
50. Id. at 307. In May 2017 DHS’s Office of Public Affairs circulated an email with draft press
conference talking points that included denials that DHS or USCIS ever looked into criminal history
or welfare data in connection with the TPS decision. Id. at 310–11.
51. According to two officials, during their combined nine years as USCIS researchers, no
senior USCIS officials had ever asked them to gather criminality or welfare data on a TPS
population. Id. at 308.
52. Letter from Sen. Bill Nelson to John F. Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(May 17, 2017), http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2017-05-17-Nelson-to-KellyHaiti-TPS-Extension.pdf.
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public benefits use of Haitian nationals protected under [TPS].”53
They noted that the “timing of this information request suggests that
this information is pretext to deny an extension of TPS,” and urged the
administration to “keep [its] review within the bounds dictated by
Congress.”54
But the administration did not hew to the TPS statute. Instead, in
addition to pressuring DHS to end the program and trying to publicly
impugn Haitian TPS recipients, the administration flouted the
conventional TPS review process to contrive a justification for
termination.55 When reviewing a country’s TPS designation, DHS is
required to consider whether “the conditions in the foreign state . . .
for which a designation is in effect . . . continue to be met.”56
Consistent with that statutory mandate, DHS traditionally undertook a
careful review of post-earthquake conditions in Haiti with respect to
housing, food security, infrastructure, and public health.57 In this
instance, however, DHS ignored or discounted these metrics. For
instance, DHS departed from the government’s past practice of
considering all country conditions at the time of the periodic review,
not just conditions that were directly attributed to the earthquake.58
DHS also discounted the impact of Hurricane Matthew and the cholera
epidemic.59 It also failed to account for “unsafe homes, food security
concerns, and longstanding public health challenges.”60 In fact, Saget
found that DHS and USCIS officials directed staff to research
information that would favor termination, and strategically edited a
key agency memorandum to support the case for termination and
undermine the case for extension.61 The Department of State also
undertook a “highly unusual” process, according to Saget.62 The U.S.

53. Letter from Sens. Robert Menendez, et al., to John F. Kelly, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. (May 19, 2017), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HAITITPS_5_19_17.pdf.
54. Id.
55. Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 347 (“[T]he evidence shows Acting Secretary Duke, the White
House, and other Government agencies and officials undertook the TPS review process with the
explicit goal of terminating TPS for Haiti.”).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3)(A) (2012).
57. Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 301.
58. Id. at 350.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 356.
61. Id. at 350–351.
62. Id. at 352–53.
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Embassy in Haiti recommended extension,63 and embassy
recommendations typically received great deference.64 But the
Embassy’s views were cast aside in this case, in contravention of
longstanding practice.65
III. THE UNITED STATES AND HAITI
Unfortunately, the administration’s disaffection for Haiti is
nothing new. The relationship of the United States to Haiti has been,
for centuries, punctuated by noxious anti-Black prejudice.66 By the
end of the eighteenth century, French Saint-Domingue—as Haiti was
then known—was the world’s largest producer of sugar, grew half of
the world’s coffee, and became the most profitable colony on earth.67
It was also a brutal slave state where between 5 and 10 percent of the
enslaved population died annually from overwork and disease.68 Many
of the enslaved people who arrived in Saint-Domingue in the late
eighteenth century were African soldiers captured in battle.69 As
Laurent Dubois writes, Saint-Domingue’s slavers were bringing
“literally thousands of soldiers to their shores.”70 In August 1791,
enslaved persons on a sugar plantation ignited the largest slave revolt
in history,71 and, within two years, every enslaved person in the colony
was free.72
Professor Dubois explains that “the Haitian Revolution was an act
of profound—and irreversible—transformation,”73 which deeply
unsettled the United States. For W.E.B. Du Bois—a founder of the
NAACP—it offered the burgeoning abolition movement “an
irresistible argument.”74 Senator Thomas Benton of Missouri
encapsulated the United States’ attitude towards Haiti in 1826:

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. For a brief summary of Haitians’ contributions to American history, see DANIELS, supra
note 19, at 212.
67. DUBOIS, supra note 1, at 19.
68. Id. at 21.
69. Id. at 23.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 5.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 16.
74. W. E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE TO THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1638–1870 70–71 (1904).
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Our policy towards Hayti . . . has been fixed . . . for three and
thirty years.[ ]We trade with her, but no diplomatic relations
have been established between us. We purchase coffee from
her and pay her for it; but we interchange no Consuls or
Ministers. We receive no mulatto Consuls or black
Ambassadors from her. And why? Because the peace of
eleven states in this Union will not permit the fruits of a
successful negro insurrection to be exhibited among them. It
will not permit black Consuls and Ambassadors to establish
themselves in our cities, and to parade through our country,
and give their fellow blacks in the United States, proof in
hand of the honors which await them, for a like successful
effort on their part.75
The United States refused to recognize Haiti’s independence until
1862,76 and America’s hostility persisted for a long time after that. In
1893, two years after he resigned from his post77 as U.S. minister and
consul general to Haiti,78 Frederick Douglass remarked, “Haiti is
black, and we have not yet forgiven Haiti for being black or forgiven
the Almighty for making her black.”79 The United States
operationalized these prejudices in 1915 when American Marines
landed in Haiti to begin an occupation that would last until 1934 and
would kill fifteen thousand Haitians.80 The Marines brought with them
to Haiti “a pure racism not felt in the country” since the nineteenth
century.81 Colonel Littleton W.T. Waller, one of the highest-ranking
commanders in the early part of the occupation, famously boasted, “I
know the nigger and how to handle him.”82 Within a year of their
arrival, the Marines saw to it that a significant number of Haitian men

75. Senator Thomas Hart Benton, Speech Delivered in the Senate of the United States in a
Secret Session on the Mission to Panama 34–35 (March 13, 1826).
76. DUBOIS, supra note 1, at 153.
77. DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS: PROPHET OF FREEDOM 709 (2018).
78. Id. at 692.
79. Frederick Douglass, Lecture on Haiti (1893), in GREAT SPEECHES BY FREDERICK
DOUGLASS 105, 106 (James Daley ed., 2013).
80. Edwidge Danticat, The Long Legacy of Occupation in Haiti, NEW YORKER
(July 28, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/haiti-us-occupation-hundred-yearanniversary.
81. AMY WILENTZ, THE RAINY SEASON: HAITI SINCE DUVALIER 41 (1989); see also DUBOIS,
supra note 1, at 225–26 (“All of the marines were white, and they brought to the ‘land of black
people’ their own experiences and expectations from the racially segregated United States.”).
82. DUBOIS, supra note 1, at 226.
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were put to forced labor.83 Haitians, led by army officer Charlemagne
Péralte,84 organized by the thousands to resist the occupation.85 The
U.S. military eventually took to bombarding the insurgents,86 and
Péralte was assassinated by two Marines.87
The federal government would repeatedly discriminate against
Haitians for the rest of the twentieth century. In one episode that is
redolent of President Trump’s association of Haitians with AIDS, in
1982 the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
singled out Haitians as being at a high risk for contracting HIV/AIDS
by virtue of their national identity.88 In 1990, the Food and Drug
Administration issued a nationwide ban on Haitian blood donations.89
By the time the CDC stopped singling out Haitians, they were already
widely associated with the disease.90
The federal government also has a well-documented history of
discrimination against Haitians with respect to federal immigration
policy. Not a single Haitian refugee or asylee was accepted by the
United States for permanent refugee status between 1981–1990.91 In
1989, Bruce Morrison, then chair of the House Subcommittee on
Immigration, pointed out how the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) was treating Haitians unfairly.92 “There’s been a lot of
discrimination [against them],” he said, “They’re black, they are from
a nation close to ours, and their country isn’t communist.”93 As scholar
Roger Daniels explains,
It is instructive to note that, despite the ideological
differences between the Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and
Bush II administrations, each has persistently discriminated
83. Id. at 238–43.
84. Id. at 223.
85. Id. at 257–58.
86. Id. at 258.
87. Id. at 260.
88. See Opportunistic Infections and Kaposi’s Sarcoma among Haitians in the United States,
CTR.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION
(July 9, 1982),
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001123.htm.
89. Bruce Lambert, Now, No Haitians Can Donate Blood, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 1990),
https://www.nytimes.com/1990/03/14/us/now-no-haitians-can-donate-blood.html.
90. See Edwidge Danticat, Trump Reopens an Old Wound for Haitians, THE NEW YORKER
(Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/trump-reopens-an-old-wound-forhaitians.
91. DANIELS, supra note 19, at 213.
92. Id.
93. Id.; see also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 451 (S.D. Fla. 1980)
(describing disparate treatment between Haitian and Cuban refugees).
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against Haitian entrants as opposed to Cubans. The Reagan
administration began the practice of towing Haitian, but not
Cuban, vessels back to where they came from, the first Bush
administration initiated the use of the naval base at
Guantanamo for detained Haitians, and the Clinton
administration expanded the use of the Cuban base, out of
the federal judiciary’s reach, as a warehouse for Haitians.94
IV. HAITIAN IMMIGRATION, EQUAL PROTECTION, AND PLENARY
POWER
The federal government’s discrimination against Haitian
immigrants has repeatedly compelled courts to wrestle with
fundamental questions about the limits of the plenary power
doctrine.95 Jean v. Nelson96 is exemplary.97 During the late 1970s and
early 1980s, thousands of Haitians sought political asylum in the
United States to escape the maniacal Duvalier regime.98 It had been
the U.S. government’s practice since 1954 to parole immigrants freely
into the United States while the government reviewed their asylum
claims.99 But in 1981, in response to the influx of undocumented
immigrants from Haiti and Cuba, the Attorney General ordered INS to
detain without parole any immigrant who could not present a prima
facie case for admission.100 When it came to individual detention
decisions, immigration inspectors could exercise unguided discretion,
94. DANIELS, supra note 19, at 214.
95. See Schuck, supra note 23, at 68 (“No single development has animated and shaped the
current transformation of immigration law more powerfully than the massive influx and subsequent
detention of aliens from Cuba, Haiti, El Salvador and other Caribbean Basin countries since 1980.
The prolonged incarceration of thousands of aliens, most of them innocent victims of severe
economic deprivation, indiscriminate armed conflict, or intense political persecution, has seared
the judicial conscience as few events since the civil rights struggles of the 1950s and 1960s have
done.”).
96. (Jean IV), 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
97. See Motomura, supra note 23, at 546 (Jean IV “captures much of what is significant about
the immigration law cases of the past decade.”).
98. See Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. at 450 (describing plight of “[p]erhaps thirty thousand Haitians
[who] have flocked to the shores of South Florida over the past thirty years, fleeing the most
repressive government in the Americas”). Franco̧is Duvalier ruled Haiti from 1957 until his death
in 1971; his son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled from 1971 until he fled the country aboard a U.S. Air
Force jet in 1986. Andrew S. Levin, Civil Society and Democratization in Haiti, 9 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 389, 457 (1995).
99. Jean v. Nelson (Jean I), 711 F.2d 1455, 1469 (11th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 727 F.2d 957 (11th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev’d, aff’d as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); see Schuck, supra note 23, at
29.
100. Jean IV, 472 U.S. at 849; see Schuck, supra note 23, at 29.
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and they did so to discriminate against Haitian asylum seekers.101
Detentions frequently lasted months, and in some cases over a year.102
For instance, in 1982 The New York Times reported on sixty-eight
Haitian men and women who were detained for seven months in a
former Navy brig.103 They had not been outdoors, except for a rare trip
in manacles to a doctor or to disciplinary quarters.104 A district court
found that the government was playing “a human shell game” with
these asylum seekers by moving them around the country to “desolate,
remote” areas.105 The detention policy was widely described as a
moral disgrace106 and challenged in a series of cases that culminated
in Jean.
Jean involved a class of Haitian asylees who alleged that the
parole policy violated the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment.107 The government argued that the asylees’ immigration
status rendered them powerless to assert equal protection rights.108 An
Eleventh Circuit panel held that excludable immigrants have a right to
be considered for parole in a non-discriminatory fashion, and therefore
could raise an equal protection claim, notwithstanding Congress’s
prerogative “over the who and how of immigration.”109 The panel
applied Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corporation110 to assess the allegations of
discrimination.111 Arlington Heights, which establishes the framework
for demonstrating that a governmental decision was motivated at least
in part by a discriminatory purpose,112 is a pillar of modern equal
protection jurisprudence. It is telling that courts adjudicating equal

101. Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1470, 1473–74.
102. Id. at 1463.
103. Laurie Johnston, 83 Haitians in Brooklyn Still Fight for Asylum, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 1982),
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/28/nyregion/83-haitians-in-brooklyn-stillfight-for-asylum.html.
104. Id.
105. Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 926 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
106. Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 976 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
107. Jean IV, 472 U.S. 846, 849 (1985). The petitioners also alleged that the government’s
change in policy violated the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (APA). Id.
108. Id. at 868, 872–73.
109. Jean I, 711 F.2d 1455, 1483–84 (11th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en
banc), aff’d as modified, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
110. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
111. Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1485.
112. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
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protection claims involving immigrants have long applied the
Arlington Heights framework without reservation.113
The Eleventh Circuit panel found that the statistical evidence
showed a “severely disproportionate impact” that revealed a pattern of
discrimination “as stark as that in Gomillion [v. Lightfoot] or Yick Wo
[v. Hopkins].”114 The panel also considered the numerous prior
lawsuits that challenged the disparate treatment of Haitian
immigrants,115 extensive testimonial evidence that Haitians were
targeted and mistreated,116 and evidence of the government’s
departures from the normal exclusion procedure.117 “All told,” the
panel explained, “plaintiffs mustered an impressive array of witnesses
and equally impressive number of documents to demonstrate
circumstantially, and to an extent, directly, intentional government
discrimination against Haitians.”118 The panel concluded that the
“plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the laws, as mandated both
by the Constitution and our interpretation of Congress’ enabling
immigration legislation.”119
The en banc Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
the district court.120 Although it did not dispute the factual findings of
invidious discrimination, it deemed the plaintiffs excludable
immigrants who had not been formally admitted into the United
States.121 In its view, the decision to parole or detain an excludable
immigrant was a part of the admissions process, and the Executive
branch was free to discriminate on the basis of national origin in
making parole decisions.122 The Supreme Court took the case in
December 1984.123

113. See Louis v. Nelson, 544 F. Supp. 973, 999 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
114. Jean I, 711 F.2d at 1489.
115. Id. at 1490–91.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1494.
119. Id. at 1509.
120. Jean IV, 727 F.2d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff’d as modified, 472 U.S. 846
(1985).
121. Id. at 969 (“Since an alien’s legal status is not altered by detention or parole under the
entry doctrine fiction, it seems clear that plaintiffs here can claim no greater rights or privileges
under our laws than any other group of aliens who have been stopped at the border.”).
122. Id. at 963 (remanding to the district court to determine whether lower-level officials
abused their discretion by discriminating on the basis of national origin, since the government
contended that the parole regulations utilized facially neutral criteria).
123. Jean v. Nelson, 469 U.S. 1071 (1984).
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The following year, in an opinion sanitized of any description of
the discrimination that Haitian refugees suffered or the deadly
consequences many would face if forced to return to Haiti,124 a sixjustice majority applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to
sidestep the equal protection issue.125 The Court held that the operative
statutes and regulations did not permit officials to discriminate on the
basis of race or national origin,126 and affirmed the en banc Eleventh
Circuit’s judgment insofar as it remanded to the district court to
determine whether the officials were acting within their authority.127
It faulted the Eleventh Circuit for reaching the parole question on
constitutional grounds.128
In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall—LDF’s first DirectorCounsel, who litigated Brown129—took the Jean majority to task for
failing to take up the constitutional issue.130 He would have held
unequivocally that the petitioners had a Fifth Amendment right to
parole decisions that are free from invidious race discrimination.131 In
Justice Marshall’s estimation, “[o]ur case law makes clear that the
excludable aliens do, in fact, enjoy Fifth Amendment protections.”132
He referred to cases that established the constitutional rights of
criminally accused immigrants, and asserted that “[t]here is no basis
for conferring constitutional rights only on those unadmitted aliens
who violate our society’s norms.”133 Finally and most forcefully,
Justice Marshall reproached the Court for betraying its “long-held and
recently affirmed commitment to apply the Constitution’s due process
and equal protection guarantees to all individuals within the reach of
our sovereignty.”134

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 475 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
Jean IV, 472 U.S. 846, 855–57 (1985).
Id. at 855.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 848.
GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE: THURGOOD MARSHALL, THE GROVELAND BOYS,
AND THE DAWN OF A NEW AMERICA 4, 336–40 (2012); Wendy Brown-Scott, Justice Thurgood
Marshall and the Integrative Ideal, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 535, 535–36 (1994).
130. Jean IV, 472 U.S. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In my mind, there is no principled
way to avoid reaching the constitutional question presented in this case.”).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 873.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 874–75.
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LDF endorsed Justice Marshall’s position as amicus curiae in
Jean.135 Describing the elimination of race discrimination as “a
national goal of the highest order,”136 LDF argued that the
Constitution must be read to prohibit intentional race discrimination
against Haitian immigrants.137 LDF felt strongly that the case
implicated the interests of all American citizens, who are collectively
and individually harmed by an atmosphere of racial prejudice
promoted by an official policy of discrimination.138 The stakes were
clear to LDF in 1985:
The actions of [the government] in this case set an example
of racial prejudice and hatred. This example can be expected
to permeate throughout society, reinforcing racist attitudes
and undermining the national goal of eliminating racial and
ethnic discrimination. Any official policy and program
incorporating invidious racial lines, regardless of the identity
of the immediate victims, represents an affront to the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection.139
The stakes are equally clear today, and TPS recipients may offer
the Supreme Court another opportunity to describe the reach of the
equal protection mandate in the immigration context.
V. TPS COURT CHALLENGES AND THE COMMUNITARIAN IDEAL
Since LDF filed its lawsuit in January 2018, three other lawsuits
have challenged the rescission decision on equal protection grounds.
Ramos v. Nielsen140 was filed in San Francisco by nine TPS
beneficiaries141 from Sudan,142 Nicaragua,143 El Salvador,144 and

135. Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. In Support of
Petitioners, Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (No. 84-5240), 1985 WL 670075, at *10.
136. Id. at *6.
137. Id.
138. Id. at *3.
139. Id. at *4.
140. 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
141. Class Action Complaint, Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (No. 3:18-cv-01554-EMC), 2018
WL 4823816.
142. Sudan was designated for TPS in 1997. Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1098. In October 2017,
DHS announced the termination of TPS effective November 2018. Id.
143. Nicaragua was designated for TPS in 1999. Id. at 1096–97. In December 2017, DHS
announced the termination of TPS effective January 2019. Id. at 1097.
144. El Salvador was designated for TPS in 2001. Id. at 1095. In January 2018, DHS announced
the termination of TPS effective September 2019. Id.
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Haiti.145 Centro Presente v. United States Department of Homeland
Security146 was filed in Boston by fourteen TPS recipients from Haiti,
El Salvador, and Honduras.147 And Saget was filed in Brooklyn by ten
TPS recipients from Haiti.148 Each involved a claim that the
administration’s decisions to terminate the various TPS programs
violated the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment
because the decisions reflected racial animus.149
The government’s efforts to dismiss the race discrimination
claims in each case have failed.150 Centro Presente and Saget applied
the Arlington Heights framework.151 So did Ramos,152 which, in
October 2018, preliminarily enjoined the federal government from
enforcing the decisions to terminate TPS for, inter alia, Haiti.153 With
respect to the equal protection claim, the court found that there were,
“at the very least, serious questions going to the merits.”154 These
serious questions were aroused by evidence suggesting that the White
House pressured DHS to end TPS.155 They were also aroused by
“evidence that President Trump harbors animus against non-white,
non-European aliens which influenced his . . . decision to end the TPS
designation.”156 Ramos also noted that the sequence of events leading
up to the rescission was “irregular and suggestive of a predetermined
outcome not based on an objective assessment.”157

145. Class Action Complaint, supra note 141.
146. 332 F. Supp. 3d 393 (D. Mass. 2018).
147. See id. at 397. Honduras was designated for TPS in 1999. Id. at 399. In May 2018, DHS
announced the termination of TPS effective January 2020. Id. at 403.
148. Saget v. Trump, 345 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
149. See id. at 291–92, 296; Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1092; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d
at 404. Plaintiffs in Saget also alleged that the government violated their due process rights, the
APA, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., and that its actions were ultra
vires of the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(A)–(C). 345
F. Supp. 3d at 292. Plaintiffs in Ramos also alleged that the government violated their substantive
due process rights and the APA. 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1092. Plaintiffs in Centro Presente also alleged
that the government violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the APA. 332 F.
Supp. 3d at 404.
150. See Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 292; Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1123; Centro Presente, 332
F. Supp. 3d at 396.
151. Saget, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 304–04; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 412.
152. Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1131.
153. Id. at 1108.
154. Id. at 1098.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1100.
157. Id. at 1101.
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Like Ramos, in April 2019, Saget preliminarily enjoined the
rescission.158 Proceeding from the principle that “[t]he equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
generally prohibits discrimination by official conduct on the basis of
race,”159 Saget concluded that Arlington Heights provided “the
governing legal standard.”160 In addition to President Trump’s
comments,161 the court considered the disparaging comments of other
administration officials.162 For instance, Secretary Kelly allegedly
said, “Haitians are ‘[n]ot a bad people, but they are welfare
recipients.’”163 Saget also considered the aberrant sequence of events
that preceded the termination decision. Saget described “a stark
departure from ordinary procedure, suggestive of a pre-determined
outcome not anchored in an objective assessment, but instead a
politically motivated agenda.”164 “[T]he evidence suggests,” the court
explained, that the White House induced DHS “to ignore statutory
guidelines, contort data, and disregard objective reason to reach a
predetermined decision to terminate TPS and abate the presence of
non-white immigrants in the country.”165
It is telling that, in these TPS cases, the government has
unsuccessfully urged the courts to apply the deferential standard set
forth by the Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii,166 which adjudicated
an Establishment Clause challenge to entry restrictions for certain
foreign nationals.167 The government argued unsuccessfully that
Hawaii requires courts to apply rational basis review to these race
discrimination claims.168 Ramos and Centro Presente distinguished
Hawaii because the government did not cite national security or
foreign policy reasons for terminating TPS.169 They also distinguished
Hawaii because TPS beneficiaries are already in the United States and,
158. Saget, 375 F. Supp. 3d at 295.
159. Id. at 365 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–500 (1954)).
160. Id. at 366.
161. Id. at 371.
162. Id. at 371–72.
163. Id. at 312 (alteration in original).
164. Id. at 372.
165. Id. at 368–69.
166. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
167. Id. at 2403.
168. See Centro Presente v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 332 F. Supp. 3d 393, 410
(D. Mass. 2018); Defendants’ Supplemental Brief Regarding Equal Protection Claim at 1, Ramos
v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (No. 18-cv-01554-EMC).
169. Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1129; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411.
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therefore, enjoy greater constitutional protections than persons who
are seeking admission for the first time.170 Ramos and Centro Presente
took care to emphasize the substantial connections that TPS
beneficiaries have developed during their time in the United States.171
Centro Presente noted that several of the plaintiffs had United States
citizen children, worked in a variety of fields, obtained educational
degrees in the United States, and were active in their communities,
such that they had developed or begun to develop the ties of permanent
residence.172 Ramos also noted that many TPS beneficiaries in the
United States have “deep, long-term ties.”173
By minding these ties, the courts are acknowledging that these
individuals are part of the fabric of their communities and deserve to
fall within the Constitution’s ambit. They are also embracing an
expansive, communitarian view of membership in American society.
Around the time of Jean, Peter Schuck described the emergence of this
communitarian ideal rooted in notions of universal rights and essential
and equal humanity, which, he predicted, would profoundly alter
immigration jurisprudence as classical immigration law’s moral and
legal foundations were increasingly discredited.174 “The forces of
change,” he wrote in 1984, “are insistently hammering at the gate,
threatening the autonomy and insularity that have long sheltered
classical immigration law from developments elsewhere in the legal
culture.”175
More than three decades later, more than six decades after Brown,
and almost eight decades after its inception, LDF continues to help
animate the forces of change, this time in an effort to engender what
Hiroshi Motomura has described as “a radically broader view of the
constitutionally protected community than that implicit in the plenary
power doctrine.”176 LDF’s dedication to that inclusive view of
American law has led the organization to shape jurisprudence in areas

170. Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1129; Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411. Ramos also
distinguished Hawaii because the executive order at issue was “issued pursuant to a very broad
grant of statutory discretion,” whereas “Congress has not given the Secretary carte blanche to
terminate TPS for any reason whatsoever.” Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1130.
171. Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1129–30.
172. Centro Presente, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 411.
173. Ramos, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1129–30.
174. Schuck, supra note 23, at 4–8.
175. Id. at 35.
176. Motomura, supra note 23, at 584.
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as seemingly disparate as education,177 capital punishment,178 voting
rights,179 and employment.180 That dedication now compels the
organization to vindicate the principle that the federal government is
not at liberty to discriminate against tens of thousands of Black men,
women, and children in the United States just because they happen to
be immigrants. As such, with the TPS case, LDF reaffirms its
fundamental commitment to the struggle for racial justice in all aspects
of American life.

177. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent
Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
178. See, e.g., Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2018); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
179. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
180. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971).

